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Impressions on a 
New Code of Ethics 
O n January 1, 1987, members of the Maryland Bar will be governed by an entirely new code of ethics called 
the MARYLAND RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, Maryland Rule 
1230 (1986). These rules are radically 
changed both as to format and substance 
from the ethical rules they replace. 
After more than five years of study, re-
search, review, hearings and drafting, the 
Commission on Evaluation of Professional 
Standards (often known as the Kutak Com-
mission for its former chairman, the late 
Robert Kutak, Esquire), recommended the 
adoption of the MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Model 
Rules) to the House of Delegates of the 
American Bar Association. This was not 
the first time that the House had consid-
ered these rules. The first consideration by 
the House occurred in February 1982 
when a motion was approved by the House 
replacing the former code with a draft of 
the new Model Rules. Proposed final 
drafts of the rules were considered at the 
1982 Annual Meeting and at the 1983 
Mid-Year Meeting. After debate and revi-
sion, the House voted to adopt the new 
code, preamble, scope, terminology and 
comments and on April 2, 1983, the new 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT were adopted by the House 
of Delegates. 
Since then, little more than a dozen states 
have adopted the Model Rules including 
Maryland. On April 15, 1986, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland ordered the adop-
tion of the Model Rules after considera-
tion of a favorable report by their own Se-
lect Committee to Study the ABA MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT. The effective date of the order is 
January 1,1987. 
The implementation of the Model Rules 
on January 1, 1987 will result in changes 
in the substantive rules which govern at-
torney conduct as well as the format by 
which the rules are promulgated. Gone is 
the tripartite system of canons, disciplinary 
by Professor William I. Weston 
rules and ethical considerations, the dis-
tinctions between which were never fully 
understood and were often misapplied. 
The tripartite system has been replaced 
with a direct, black-letter approach in 
which the standards of practice and con-
duct are written in language which is open 
and direct. Each topic is considered in a 
relatively unified fashion and the organiza-
tional format and numbering system are 
less cumbersome than those of the tripartite 
system. Thus, entry into the Model Rules 
is not as forbidding and confusing as under 
the former code. 
Because the only applicable and enforce-
able language is contained in the rules 
themselves, the aspirational and philo-
sophical language is only reposed in the 
commentaries where it rightfully belonged 
all along. The text of the Model Rules 
itself is authoritative and comprehensible. 
The more than fifty rules in the Model 
Rules are divided into eight substantive 
categories each dealing with aspects of the 
role of an attorney and the relationship of 
that role to a variety of individuals and in-
stitutions. The groups are: 
-the client-lawyer relationship 
- the lawyer as a counselor 
- the lawyer as advocate 
- transactions with persons other than 
clients 
-law firms and associations 
- public service 
- information about legal services 
- maintaining the integrity of the 
profession 
The Client-Lawyer Relationship 
The greatest amount of consideration is 
given to the client-lawyer relationship. 
Every aspect of that relationship from at-
torney competence to terminating the re-
lationship is considered. Many of the rules 
in each of the eight sections are restate-
ments or improved statements of the prior 
rules. In addition to restating the existing 
rules, the drafters also effectively com-
bined the substance of the canons, ethical 
considerations and disciplinary rules to 
produce a consistent, black letter statement 
reflective of the prior rule. 
There have been substantial changes in 
the areas of fees, communication between 
the attorney and the client, confidentiality 
and attorney advertising/soliciting. It is in-
teresting to note that the first Model Rule 
is a statement on lawyer competence. Al-
though largely a restatement of the concept 
contained in MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 
6-101(A)(1) (1980), the new rule is phrased 
in the positive rather than suggesting 
when an attorney ought not to handle the 
matter. Moreover, Rule 1.1 specifically 
defines the elements of competent repre-
sentation by an attorney. The rule also en-
visions proper preparation by the attorney 
as part of competent representation. 
Rule 1.2(a) is a definitive statement of 
what had previously been thought to be 
the rule-that the client controls the sub-
stance of a case; the attorney the conduct. 
But even as to the conduct of the case, the 
attorney is directed to consult with his 
or her client. Finally, the decision as to 
whether or not to accept a settlement offer 
or a plea bargain lies strictly with the 
client. Although MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 
7-7 and 7-8 allowed the attorney to make 
decisions as to some unspecified aspect of 
the conduct of a case, the issue was not ad-
dressed as part of the disciplinary rules. 
The clarification and codification of this 
aspect of the attorney-client relationship is 
a strong and positive step toward defining 
the responsibility of the attorney toward 
his or her client. 
Rule 1.3 again, is a direct and clear state-
ment as to the attorney's obligation to act 
with diligence and promptness in a legal 
matter. There is no similar counterpart in 
the prior code although general language 
in DR 6-101 has often been construed to 
include diligence as part of the fiduciary 
duty owed by an attorney to a client. Dila-
Fa/~ 1986rrhe Law Forum-31 
tory conduct by an attorney remains the 
singular most frequent complaint raised 
by clients. 
Rule 1.4 takes another step toward es-
tablishing in clear language the parameters 
of the attorney-client relationship and the 
obligations owed by an attorney to his or 
her client. As with Rule 1.3, the language 
seems almost simplistic in requiring an at-
torney to keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and providing 
reasonable explanations of the matter be-
ing handled by the attorney. Failure to 
communicate as to the progress of the case 
and as to the nature of the case represent 
consistent complaints by clients. Rule 1.4 
establishes a level of informed consent 
analogous to that obligation owed by a 
physician to his or her patient. Although 
based on a different premise (the physi-
cian's duty is based on the right of each 
person to hold his or her body inviolate 
while the attorney's obligation is based on 
the fiduciary relationship), the premise is 
identical. The client, like the patient coun-
terpart, makes the relevant decisions and 
the professional is bound to satisfy the con-
cept of materiality-providing sufficient 
quantity and quality ofinformation for the 
client to make the substantive decisions. 
Attorney Fees 
The subject of attorney's fees has under-
gone substantial clarification under the 
Model Rules. Section 1.5 of the new rules 
replaces the emphasis in the prior code on 
illegal or excessive fees with a requirement 
that fees shall be reasonable. Rather than a 
cumbersome reliance on the definition of a 
clearly excessive fee, attorneys can look to 
the application of enumerated factors in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee. 
The second substantial change is the cre-
ation of a dichotomy between a new and a 
former client with regard to the determina-
tion and explanation of an attorney's fee. 
Under Section 1. 5(b) an attorney is re-
quired to tell the client the rate of the fee, 
preferably in writing shortly after the com-
mencement of the attorney-client relation-
ship. The failure of attorneys in general to 
reduce fee agreements to writing and to 
discuss fees early in the relationship is an 
issue of constant concern both to organiza-
tions which engage in arbitration of at-
torneys fees and to courts which are asked 
to pass on the appropriateness of an at-
torney's fee. One would think that com-
mon sense would obviate the necessity for 
this provision; but the failure of attorneys 
to discuss fees with their clients and the 
failure of attorneys to reduce parole fee 
agreements to writing recurs. 
As a further step toward written fee 
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agreements, the new rules require con-
tingent fee agreements to be in writing and 
require that such an agreement set forth 
the method by which the fee will be de-
termined including the percentage to be 
charged by the attorney from the ultimate 
settlement, the fee involved in trial and/or 
appeal, the costs to be deducted and when 
such a deduction will take place and fmally, 
the attorney is required to produce a writ-
ten settlement statement in the case of a 
contingent fee arrangement. 
Failure to 
communicate as to 
the progress of the 
case and as to the 
nature of the case 
represent consistent 
complaints by clients. 
Section (d) of the same provision pro-
hibits fees which are contingent upon the 
outcome in domestic relations cases. U n-
like the prohibition against contingent fees 
in criminal cases which was contained in 
DR 2-106 (C), the similar prohibition in 
domestic relations cases was referred to 
obliquely in Ee 2-20. The wording of the 
new section is curious in that the section 
does not use language which is consistent 
with section (d)(2) prohibiting contingent 
fees in criminal cases. Rather, the lawyer is 
not to charge a fee in a domestic relations 
case which is contingent upon the securing 
of a divorce or the amount of alimony, sup-
port or property distribution. Because 
there is no res as in a personal injury action 
from which the fee could be taken and be-
cause the role of the lawyer in a domestic 
relations case is quite different, there are 
legitimate concerns about any fee which 
appears to be result oriented. 
The attorney in a domestic relations 
matter is dealing with issues as to the fu-
ture welfare of the parties he or she is rep-
resenting. While there are economic con-
sequences involved in domestic relations, 
the framers of the Model Rules expect the 
attorney to go beyond the purely economic 
issues involved in obtaining a particular 
result to the human issues of dealing with 
the needs of the client. One of the strong-
est basis upon which property and alimony 
are awarded is the need of the party re-
questing the award, such as, emotional 
needs, physical needs and economic needs. 
Thus, the attorney is restrained from using 
a result orientation in setting a fee for a 
domestic relations client. 
The final change with regard to fees con-
cerns the division of fees. A fee may be di-
vided between attorneys not in the same 
firm if the client is advised of the arrange-
ment, consents to it, and the two attorneys 
either divide the work or share the respon-
sibility; and the total fee is reasonable for 
the work performed by both attorneys. 
Under the former code both actual work 
and responsibility were required before a 
fee could be divided; the model rules al-
lows division if either occurs. The con-
tinued receipt and payment of referral fees 
by attorneys without satisfying the require-
ments of either the new section or its prede-
cessor is a recurring problem. There is a 
myth among attorneys that when one re-
fers a case, that gratuitous act, performed 
in the best interests of the client, warrants 
the payment of a referral or finders fee by 
the second attorney. In most cases, the first 
attorney has done nothing more than what 
he or she is ethically obligated to do. It has 
always been the rule that in order to collect 
a fee from a client, the attorney must as-
sume some responsibility for the conduct 
of the case. To collect a fee for referral 
absent either work or responsibility or 
both is by definition unreasonable and 
should not be part of the popular conduct 
of attorneys. 
Client Confidentiality 
Rule 1.6 deals with confidentiality where 
several changes were made to the prior 
model code section dealing with confi-
dentiality (DR 4-lO1). The first change is 
the elimination of the secrets/confidences 
dichotomy in the old code. The distinction 
between these tWo was poorly defined and 
the two were often combined when eval-
uating attorney conduct. The Model Rules 
require that an attorney not reveal infor-
mation relating to the representation of the 
client. In the comments, the attorney is re-
minded of his or her duty to hold inviolate 
confidential information of the client. The 
Model Rules broadens the prior code by 
creating an umbrella ofinformation which 
deals with the representation of the client 
rather than creating pidgeonholes in the 
form of confidences and secrets in which 
the attorney must fit the data obtained. 
The new rule is also broader in that the 
source of the protected information is de-
emphasized in favor of the umbrella ofin-
formation theory mentioned above. 
The process by which, and the informa-
tion which an attorney may reveal have 
also undergone substantial change in the 
new rules. The prior provision which al-
lowed an attorney to reveal information in 
order to collect a fee has been broadened to 
include any claim or defense in a contro-
versy between the attorney and client. The 
provision which allowed (mandated) that 
an attorney reveal an intention of the client 
to commit a crime and the information 
necessary to prevent the crime has been 
substantially changed. Under the Model 
Rules, the attorney may reveal informa-
tion to prevent the client from committing 
a criminal act likely to result in imminent 
death or substantial bodily harm. Mary-
land has added language which was con-
tained in the original Kutak report which 
requires an attorney to reveal information 
to prevent a client from committing a 
criminal or fraudulent act which is likely to 
result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another; in addi-
tion to the lawyer's duty to reveal informa-
tion to prevent bodily harm. The attorney 
is also obligated in Maryland to rectify the 
consequences of the client's criminal or 
fraudulent act in which the attorney's ser-
vices were used. Finally, an attorney is 
mandated to comply with the confidential-
ity rules, a court order or other law. 
The latter statement (Subsection (b)(4)) 
is redundant in light of the adoption of the 
rules by the court of appeals which thereby 
mandates compliance. As an officer of the 
court, an attorney is already obligated to 
comply with a court order or "other law". 
The purpose and necessity of this latter 
provision is unclear. The application of 
the rectification provision is very unclear 
and will require substantial explanation by 
bar associations and the courts. Moreover, 
there is absolutely no guidance as to ade-
quacy and degree of rectification which 
will satisfy an attorney's obligation. 
The final problem with Maryland's ver-
sion of the Model Rule 1.6 concerns the 
extension of the attorney's duty to reveal 
information beyond bodily harm and death 
to financial and property injuries. The 
comments adopted by the court of appeals 
are little more than a carbon copy of the 
comments provided in the ABA version of 
the rules. No guidance is given to explain 
the type of fraudulent act sufficient to war-
rant disclosure and/or rectification. Must 
the domestic relations attorney who is told 
by his client of the potential sale of a pi~ce 
of allegedly marital property reveal the 
potential sale? What if the offer to buy oc-
curred in a social setting and was not fol-
lowed by documents? Finally, what defini-
tion and standard of fraud will be legally 
sufficient in the application of this rule in 
a day to day setting? This extension by 
Maryland is a poorly drafted and con-
ceived excursion in uncharted waters 
where the hazards are as much illusory as 
real. 
Conflicts of Interest 
Sections 1. 7-1.10 deal with conflicts of 
interest situations. Section 1.8 (e)(l) is dif-
ferent from the prior code in that a client 
need not remain ultimately liable for all 
expenses advanced by the attorney. Sec-
.. . the attorney may 
reveal information 
to prevent the client 
from committing a 
criminal act likely to 
result in imminent 
or substantial bodily 
harm. 
tion 1. 9 is new to the rules and the closest 
counterpart in the old code is the provision 
requiring that an attorney avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety. This rule aban-
dons the impropriety approach in favor of 
approaching conflicts in a substantive man-
ner. Where an attorney has represented a 
client, he cannot represent another person 
in the same matter involving adverse inter-
ests to the former client without consent of 
the latter. The attorney is further pro-
hibited from using information which 
would disadvantage the former client. 
Section 1.13 codifies the provisions of 
EC 5-8 which indicated that an attorney 
represents the entity and not the persons 
connected with the entity. The section 
clarifies the relationship of the officers and 
directors to the corporation and allows for 
dual representation of the entity and di-
rectors, officers, employees, members and 
shareholders if there is no conflict ofinter-
est. The substance of this section is di-
rected to the issue of conflicts of interest 
rather than the concern of the code which 
was interference in independent profes-
sional judgment. 
Attorney Dilatory Conduct 
Rule 3.2 clarifies the prior code section 
(DR 7-102 (A)(l)) by mandating that an 
attorney take appropriate steps consistent 
with the interests of the client to expedite 
litigation. Dilatory conduct by attorneys is 
a recurring problem and the subject of 
consistent complaints by clients. Although 
delay can occur for a variety of reasons 
many of which have nothing to do with the 
conduct of the attorney, failure on the part 
of an attorney to move the case forward is 
an all-to frequent occurrence. The language 
of the new rule shifts the obligation from 
the negative to the positive by obligating 
the attorney to take steps to expedite rather 
than prohibiting an attorney from acting 
in such a way as to delay. 
False Evidence 
Rule 3.3 takes substantial steps to pre-
vent the introduction of fraudulent testi-
mony and goes further than the prior code 
in obligating the attorney to take appropri-
ate steps to correct the situation when he 
becomes aware of the fraud or the falsity of 
evidence. This provision and its ancillary 
sections in Rule 3 clearly require candor 
and require the attorney take appropriate 
steps to insure candor. The attorney is 
even required, in Rule 3.3 to reveal all ma-
terial relevant facts in an ex parte proceed-
ing whether or not they are adverse. Rule 
3.4 adds the requirement of candor in the 
conduct of discovery so as to avoid frivolous 
discovery actions and to avoid unreason-
able delay as to the conduct of discovery. 
Trial Publicity 
Rule 3.6 dealing with trial publicity is 
substantially changed from its predecessor 
section (DR 7-107) in format and in degree 
of specificity. The new rule also adopts as 
a test in trial publicity a new standard: 
"substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing an adjudicative proceeding." The 
new rule eliminates the ponderous distinc-
tions between types of proceedings in the 
former code and replaces the language 
with a clear statement as to the obligations 
of an attorney and indirectly reinforces an 
attorney's obligations as an officer of the 
court despite his or her duty to zealously 
represent a client. 
Attorney Advertising 
The final area in which there has been 
substantial departure from the predecessor 
code is advertising. The prior section 
DR 2-101 was promulgated as a reluctant 
reaction to the Supreme Court decision of 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 
350 (1977). Prohibitions against advertis-
ing date back to the American Bar Associa-
tion Canons of Professional Ethics of 
1908. The ABA Canons were a redraft of 
the Alabama Code of Ethics which was 
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adopted in 1887 and which also contained 
the prohibition against advertising by at-
torneys. The theory behind the prohibition 
was a combination of a desire for profes-
sionalism and dignity among lawyers and 
as a means of avoiding all-out competition 
among attorneys. Word of mouth was con-
sidered the most effective advertising and 
if there was to be any advertising, it was 
limited to providing a notice of location 
and existence of the law office through 
very limited mechanisms such as business 
cards, directory advertising and recognized 
law lists. 
The milieu in which the original ban on 
advertising was promulgated became in-
creasingly obsolete. Attorneys practiced in 
a mercantile and competitive atmosphere 
rather than the rarified atmosphere of the 
"noble profession". Moreover, bar asso-
ciations became zealous in their enforce-
ment of the ban on advertising to the point 
of absurdity. Attorneys, for example, were 
prohibited from placing a name and mes-
sage in a local booster newspaper. Instead 
they were told they had to place the adver-
tisement anonymously. The Bates decision 
was an example of the Supreme Court act-
ing for the profession when the profession 
refused to take a more reasoned course. 
The resulting Model Rules provisions and 
the progeny of the Bates decision have ef-
fected a practice area in which just about 
anything goes. Only statements which are 
misleading or false or contain a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law, which 
create unjustified expectations as to results 
or which compare one lawyer to another 
are proscribed. The advertising attorney is 
required under Section 7.2 to keep a copy 
of advertisements for two years (instead of 
an indefinite period under the prior code) 
and attorney advertising must list the name 
of at least one attorney responsible for the 
content of the advertisement. The aboli-
tion of the list of approved advertisement 
vehicles (DR 2-101 (B)(1-25» is the final 
step toward the elimination of any con-
straints as to the type of advertisement and 
the medium chosen and the complete dis-
avowal of the dignity of the profession ap-
proach contained in all of the prior ver-
sions of the code. Advertising which runs 
the gamut from shopping carts in grocery 
stores to television videos, that meets the 
limitations contained in Model Rule 7.1, 
is permitted. The payment of value for the 
recommendation of an attorney's services 
(other, of course than by another attorney) 
is still prohibited, thereby retaining the 
historical prohibitions against the use of a 
paid "runner" to find cases. 
The prohibition against soliciting is re-
tained in Model Rule 7.3 although the 
exceptions have been defined a bit more 
clearly than they were in DR 2-104. The 
new rule also prohibits the attorney from 
taking advantage of a person who is phys-
ically or emotionally incapable of exercis-
ing independent judgment and the provi-
sions prohibit the attorney from employing 
coercion, duress or harrassment in contact-
ing a prospective client. The validity of 
Model Rule 7.3 has been thrown into 
doubt by a series of cases before the V.S. 
Supreme Court in which the Court allowed 
advertising directed either to a specific 
type of client (Dalkon Shield plaintiffs: 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
105 S.Ct. 2265 (1985); or to a specific 
client (direct mail solicitation to the vic-
tims and families of the Hyatt-Regency 
skywalk accident: Matter of Von Wiegen, 
63 N.Y. 2d 163,470 N.E. 2d 838 (1984), 
cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 2701 (1985». One 
jurisdiction has upheld the regulation of 
electronic media advertising. Iowa's rules 
expressly prohibit television advertise-
ments which contain background sounds 
and effects other than a single voice in a 
non-dramatic state. The Iowa Supreme 
Court in Committee on Professional Ethics v. 
Humphrey 355 N.W. 2d 565 (Iowa 1984), 
vacated, 105 S.Ct. 2693 (1985), upheld the 
restrictive rules on the basis that this type 
of advertising presented different and un-
usual problems. After the Supreme Court 
decision in Zauderer, the Iowa decision 
was vacated and remanded. In a second 
opinion after remand, the Iowa Supreme 
Court adhered to its former position in 
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Hum-
phrey, 377 N.W. 2d 643 (Iowa 1985), ap-
peal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1626 (1986). The 
Iowa Supreme Court based its decision on 
the unique nature of the advertisement on 
television which does not afford the viewer 
time for contemplation or analysis but 
rather appeals to emotional and instinctive 
reactions. The V.S. Supreme Court dis-
missed an appeal in the case for lack of a 
substantial federal question. Humphrey v. 
Committee on Professional Ethics 106 S.Ct. 
1626 (1986). 
Conclusion 
The full impact of the Model Rules will 
not be realized for some years as bar asso-
ciations, courts and grievance commissions 
grapple with the plain meaning of the 
words contained in the rules. The quan-
tum jump in attorney malpractice litiga-
tion will result in further evaluation of the 
standards set forth in the Model Rules. 
Even if the Model Rules result in no less 
litigation, no fewer ethics opinions or dis-
ciplinary proceedings, they will be a posi-
tive addition to the evaluation of attorney 
conduct because of their clarity, concise-
ness and organization. 
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